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1959] NOTES
PLEADING AND PRACTICE - APPEAL OF DISSOLUTION OF
NONRESIDENT ATTACHMENT
Plaintiff brought an action for indebtedness coupled with a
writ of attachment under which certain property was seized on
the ground that defendants were absentees or nonresidents of the
state. Intervenor moved for dissolution of the writ on part. of
the property seized. Upon plaintiff's failure to answer the inter-
vention, a default judgment was rendered against him, dissolving
the attachment as to a portion of the property. Eleven months
later, plaintiff appealed devolutively from the judgment dis-
solving the attachment. The Supreme Court held motion to dis-
miss the appeal sustained. The validity of a judgment dissolving
a nonresident writ of attachment cannot be affected by a re-
versal of the judgment on a devolutive appeal, for jurisdiction
over the property has been lost. Such legal consequences could
have been avoided only by taking and perfecting a suspensive
appeal. South Street Lumber Co. v. Dickerson, 106 So.2d 513
(La. 1958).
There are two distinct types of attachments under Louisiana
law: resident,1 where the writ is merely incidental to a demand
in personam, and nonresident 2 where the proceeding is quasi
in rem,8 operating only upon the property seized. The resident
1. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 240 (1870) : "A creditor may obtain such at-
tachment of the property of his debtor, in the following cases: (1) When such
debtor is about leaving permanently the State, without there being a possibility,
in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, of obtaining or executing judgment
against him previous to his departure, or when such debtor has already left the
State permanently. . . . (3) When he conceals himself to avoid being cited and
forced to answer to the suit intended to be brought against him. (4) When he has
mortgaged, assigned or disposed of, or is about to mortgage, assign or dispose of
his property, rights or credits, or some part thereof with intent to defraud his
creditors or give an unfair preference to some of them. (5) When he has con-
verted, or is about to convert his property into money or evidences of debt, with
intent to place it beyond the reach of his creditors."
2. Id. art. 240(2) : "A creditor may obtain such attachment of the property of
his debtor .. . (2) When such debtor resides out of the State." LA. R.S. 13:3952
(1950), originally La. Act 1932, No. 220, § 1: "In all suits in which the demand
is for a money judgment and the defendant is a non-resident of this state, or
when the defendant is not domiciled in this state, whatever may be the nature,
character or origin of the plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff may sue out a writ of
attachment against the defendant's property, whether the claim be for a sum
certain or for an uncertain amount, and whether the claim be liquidated or un-
liquidated, upon making affidavit and giving bond as now required by law in
suits against non-resident defendants, provided that the provisions of this Section
shall not apply in cases in which the defendant has a duly appointed agent in the
state upon whom service of process may be made."
3. Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185 (1886) : "There is, however, a large
class of cases which are not strictly actions in rem, but are frequently spoken of
as actions quasi in rem, because, though brought against persons, they only seek
to subject certain property of those persons to the discharge of the claims as-
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attachment is a conservatory writ provided by law in aid of and
to protect the creditor's rights under certain circumstances4 in a
personal action against the debtor. The citation is the basis of
jurisdiction for the action, with the attachment as an incident
thereof.5 In the case of the nonresident attachment, however,
the action is not a demand on the person, but upon the property
seized. 6 The attachment itself constitutes the principal demand,
is the very foundation of the suit, and stands as the basis of
jurisdiction and in place of the citation required in ordinary
proceedings.7 It becomes apparent, then, that when the proceed-
ing is predicated upon the writ of attachment, dissolution of the
writ results in dismissal of the action. 8 However, the attaching
creditor is not without remedy, for it is well settled that an
appeal may be taken from an interlocutory judgment which re-
leases property from attachment.9
The necessity of taking a suspensive rather than a devolutive
appeal from the dismissal of nonresident attachments was first
recognized in the early case of Watson v. Simpson'° in which the
court held that such an appeal was essential to maintain the
liability of sureties on a bond releasing property attached, after
the attachment had been dissolved. This principle was reaf-
firmed sixty-five years later in Stanford v. Bischoff," where the
court announced that a devolutive appeal from a judgment sus-
taining an exception of no cause of action did not stay the dis-
solution of the nonresident attachment; therefore, the attach-
ment could not be reinstated on appeal even though judgment
serted. Such are actions in which property of non-residents is attached and held
for the discharge of debts due by them to citizens of the State."
4. See circumstances enumerated in note 1 8upra.
5. Burgin Bros. & McCane v. Barker Baking Co., 152 La. 1075, 95 So. 227
(1922).
6. Ibid.
7. Hope v. Gordon, 186 La. 697, 173 So. 177 (1937) ; W. H. Hodges & Co. v.
Penn R.R., 171 La. 699, 132 So. 115 (1931) ; Collins v. McCook, 136 So. 204
(1931) ; Latham v. Glasscock, 160 La. 1089, 108 So. 100 (1926) ; Pugh v.
Flannery, 151 La. 1063, 92 So. 699 (1922); First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v.
Drexler, 171 So. 151 (La. App. 1936) ; Wright v. Melder, 125 So. 765 (La. App.
1930).
8. First Nat. Bank v. Pierson, 176 La. 792, 146 So. 749 (1933); Watson v.
Simpson, 15 La. Ann. 709 (1860) ; Schlatter v. Broaddus, 4 Mart.(N.S.) 430
(1826).
9. Pittman v. Lilly, 197 La. 233, 1 So.2d 88 (1941) ; Stanford v. Bischoff, 159
La. 892, 106 So. 371 (1925) ; Bayne v. Cusimano, 50 La. Ann. 361, 23 So. 361
(1897) ; Wickman & Pendleton v. Nalty, 41 La. Ann. 284, 6 So. 123 (1889) ;
Watson v. Simpson, 15 La. Ann. 709 (1860) ; Love, Savage & Co. v. McComas
& Cloon, 14 La. Ann. 201 (1859) ; Hyde v. Jenkins, 6 La. 427 (1834) ; Laverty
v. Anderson, 4 Mart.(O.S.) 606 (1817).
10. 15 La. Ann. 709 (1860).
11. 159 La. 892, 106 So. 371 (1925).
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NOTES
on the exception was reversed. However, in both of these cases
the defendants, though nonresidents, submitted personally to the
jurisdiction of the court, so the requirement of taking a suspen-
sive appeal to maintain the jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter was not at issue.
A comprehensive search on this point in other states re-
vealed only that one other court indirectly approached the issue
here presented when determining whether a timely appeal from
the dissolution of an attachment resulted in a stay of judgment.12
The court said: "The present action is, in part, one in rem ...
Dissolution of the attachment . . . in this case was tantamount
to release of the res from the jurisdiction of the court and plain-
tiff's appeal must be held to stay such release for otherwise the
anomalous result would be a timely and well-taken appeal with-
out a respondent."
Not until the instant case has a Louisiana court had occasion
to announce that the taking of a suspensive appeal is a pre-
requisite for maintaining jurisdiction over the suit after judg-
ment dismissing the nonresident attachment is rendered. The
court reasoned that once a seizure of property by way of non-
resident attachment has been dissolved, the judgment of disso-
lution, upon failure of the seizing creditor to obtain and perfect
a suspensive appeal, releases the res which is the basis of juris-
diction. Inasmuch as the attachment could not be revived or re-
instated by means of a devolutive appeal, the case was moot;
and the court refused to pass on the rights of the creditor. This
decision appears to be the only one possible. The creditor having
failed to take and perfect a suspensive appeal, the inevitable
legal results were release of the property and termination of
the suit. A reversal on a devolutive appeal of the final and
executed judgment dissolving the attachment would find the
court powerless to breathe new life into the original attachment
since jurisdiction had been lost. Thus, it becomes apparent that
such a consequence could have been precluded only by employing
the suspensive appeal.
It is submitted that the court's decision is both logical and
sound, although it should be noted that it impales a creditor on
the horns of a dilemma: If he elects to appeal suspensively from
the dissolution of the nonresident attachment, he potentially in-
creases the damages for which he will be liable should it be
12. Melton v. Walker, 209 S.C. 330, 336, 40 S.E.2d 161, 163 (1946).
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found, on appeal, that the attachment was validily dissolved.
On the other hand, if he chooses not to appeal suspensively,
jurisdiction over the action is lost and the creditor's suit
terminated.
Joseph W. Milner
QUASI CONTRACTS -THE FUND DOCTRINE
Plaintiffs in the instant proceeding were attorneys who, in a
prior suit, had been employed to represent a relatively small
group of depositors opposing a tableaux for distribution of funds
held by a bank in liquidation. The basis of the depositors' oppo-
sition was that interest from the date of liquidation had not been
included in the proposed distribution. The trial court had award-
ed interest not only to the claiming depositors represented by
plaintiffs but also to all depositors. On appeal of the depositors'
case, the appellant, the banking commissioner, contended that the
lower court had erred in awarding interest to the depositors from
the inception of the liquidation. He also contended that the lower
court had erred in awarding interest to depositors who failed to
oppose the distribution. During that appeal, the attorneys had
sought affirmance of the judgment of the lower court which had
allowed interest from the inception of the liquidation; they also
had sought to have the judgment affirmed with respect to the
unrepresented depositors. The Supreme Court had affirmed the
lower court in allowing interest to all depositors from the incep-
tion of the liquidation.' The attorneys then sought compensation
for professional services rendered to all depositors. The bases of
their claim are: first, in answering the appeal of the depositors'
case, they had sought affirmance of the judgment allowing inter-
est from the inception of the liquidation for their clients, and
also had sought affirmance of the judgment allowing interest to
the unrepresented depositors; and second, if the proposed distri-
bution had not been opposed, the depositors as a class would have
received no interest. The lower court rejected this claim; the
Supreme Court, on rehearing, held, reversed. These attorneys
have brought themselves within the "fund doctrine," and they
should recover attorneys' fees, on a quantum meruit, out of the
funds so created. In re Interstate Trust and Banking Company,
235 La. 825, 106 So.2d 276 (1958).
1. In re Interstate Trust and Banking Co., 222 La. 979, 64 So.2d 240 (1953).
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